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Tiivistelmä 
Tämän tutkimuksen tarkoituksena on tarkastella yksityishenkilöiden kyvykkyyksiä ja 
valmiuksia hinnoitella tarjontaansa jakamistaloudessa. Hinnoittelua tarkastellaan 
muutoksissa hinnoissa huomioiden kysynnän vaihtelu vuoden aikana. Keskeisiä konsepteja 
tutkimukselle ovat tuoton hallinta (revenue management), katehinnoittelu sekä hotellien ja 
Airbnb hinnan määrittävät hintatekijät. Tutkimus toteutetaan tilastollisella data analyysillä. 
Datalähteinä toimivat Trivagon kuukausikohtaiset hintaindeksit sekä Insideairbnb.comin 
tuottama avoin data tutkimuskäyttöön. Nämä tietolähteet mahdollistavat Airbnb hintojen 
tarkastelun aikavälillä 2015-2017 ja otokseen kuuluu yhteensä 12 kaupunkia (viisi 
Euroopasta, viisi Pohjois-Amerikasta sekä kaksi Australiasta). Kaikissa kaupungeissa on 
kuukausittain useita tuhansia asuntoja/huoneita tarjolla. 
Aiempi tutkimus aiheesta on tunnistanut käyttäjän luonteenpiirteiden ja käsityksien 
vaikuttavan halukkuuteen osallistua jakamistalouteen. Aiempi tutkimus ei ole pyrkinyt 
tutkimaan jakamistalouden hinnoittelua ehdottamallani tavalla. Empiirisen osion 
havaintojen pohjalta suurin osa Airbnb:ssä vuokraavista ihmisistä ei pyri korkeampaan 
tuottoon muokkaamalla hinnoitteluaan kysyntäpiikkien mukaan – ainakaan hotelleihin 
verrattavissa olevassa skaalassa. Tutkimus näytti, että Airbnb:n ja hotellien eriävästä 
luonteesta johtuen, Airbnb-asunnon hinta voi olla halvempi lähempänä matkustuspäivää 
kuin kuukausia aikaisemmin. Tutkimuksen tarkoitus ei ole ehdottaa, että Airbnb-isäntien 
tulisi pyrkiä korkeampaan tuottoon ja tehdä liiketoimintaa asunnollaan. Airbnb:ssä 
vuokraavien tulisi tiedostaa lain asettamat rajoitteet lyhytaikaiselle vuokraamiselle sekä 
soveltuvat verosäädökset. 
Tutkimuksen havainnot ovat tärkeitä, mikäli tulevaisuuden liiketoimintamallit ovat 
riippuvaisia yksityishenkilöiden kyvykkyydestä hinnoitella tarjoamansa. Harkintaa tulisi 
tällöin osoittaa sekä yksityishenkilön että alustantarjoajan osalta. Samalla lainsäädännön 
näkökulmaa ei tule unohtaa, jotta markkinatoimijat toimivat samoilla edellytyksillä eivätkä 
syyllisty saalistushinnoitteluun. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and motivation 
The concept of sharing economy has received much interest in the past years. It continues to 
gather new business ideas and aspiring market disruptors today. Estimates of the future 
market potential predict a growth from $15 billion to $335 billion in 2025 in P2P finance, 
online staffing, P2P accommodation, car sharing and music/video streaming (PwC, 2014). 
Most people can easily recognize widespread brands such as Airbnb, Lyft, Uber and in 
Helsinki the well-received city bikes, DriveNow and maybe even OP Kulku. Each service is 
different in their own ways, in terms of pricing and subscriptions. Some classifications of 
sharing economies exclude certain services based on their business model, while archaic 
versions of sharing economies also exist – such as libraries.  
The primary interest in the subject field lies with yield management or revenue 
management that a sharing economy based business model employs – an approach that is 
not exclusive to sharing economy. More specifically, I am interested in examining the 
capability of individual citizens in determining the right market price for the 
product/service/accommodation that they are providing. If future business models rely more 
on consumers setting the price for services and products, corporations would have a major 
incentive to guide them in setting the rental price as close to valid market price as possible. 
In the case of Airbnb or Uber for example, the companies receive their profits by receiving 
a percentage of what the customer pays for their stay or taxi ride. From here onwards the 
business models differ, as Uber sets the prices that the drivers must accept while Airbnb 
makes no pricing decisions on the users' behalf and try to underline this distinction to the 
authorities. 
In this thesis, I will focus on Airbnb and the way that their hosts set prices for the 
accommodation that they provide. I will draw parallels between the disrupting player and 
traditional hotel industry to examine to what extent the average Airbnb price differs from 
hotel prices each month. Airbnb has launched initiatives to educate the hosts to set their 
rental prices according to their suggestions. They provide insights to aid hosts in selecting 
the suitable price through their proprietary algorithms (Airbnb, 2015). Airbnb’s default 
capabilities for price setting have been criticized (Airbnb Community Center, 2016-2017), 
and external service providers have risen to help Airbnb hosts maximize their profits such 
as Beyond Pricing and Guesty. 
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The hotel industry along with the airline industry have embraced the practice of yield 
management (a form of revenue management) a long time ago to maximize their profits with 
their limited capacity to accommodate guests. I will examine the different tactics to 
maximize revenue employed by the hotel industry, and examine these tactics in the case of 
Airbnb where pricing decisions are left with the citizens renting their apartments and rooms 
to complete strangers. However, I will deliver my main contribution through data analysis, 
which examines several locations on a high level, instead of focusing the pricing tactics of 
single Airbnb hosts. 
Business models with a sharing economy approach at heart have entered several 
markets – and one could argue have been on the market for a long time. People’s reasons to 
participate in sharing economy is a factor that could be expected to affect their pricing 
behavior – a point that merits further examination through the literature review. 
Nevertheless, not considering for varying motivation in engaging in sharing economy, 
people seek to set a price that gives them a reasonable return on their offering. Do they have 
all the necessary information to set the price correctly, however, and the question remains – 
do they price their offering the way they should? 
1.2 Objectives 
My thesis aims to shed light on the ability (and willingness) of individual citizens to perform 
pricing decisions. I.e. price their rental offering on par with the market price, and expand the 
finding to provide suggestions for businesses seeking to use sharing economy based business 
models in general – not only for Airbnb or the lodging industry.  
Upon reading this thesis the reader will be familiarized with concepts of revenue 
management, different price determinants in the hotel industry, price determinants in Airbnb 
and be able to identify the importance of providing individual citizens (freelancers) with 
tools that facilitate pricing decisions. The literature review section will highlight the 
importance of transparency in pricing models.  
Key contribution from the thesis will be, however, the increase in knowledge of how 
prepared Airbnb hosts – and by extension individuals in general – are to take responsibility 
of pricing their offerings. If business models where companies allow their freelancers 
(individual citizens) decide the prices for them become more common in the future, they 
will have to be careful with how they do it and should they do it. These objectives translate 
into the following research questions detailed in the next section. 
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1.3 Research questions 
1) What can be discerned from identifiable trends between Airbnb pricing and hotel 
pricing? 
 
2) Based on Airbnb rental booking and price data, how common is it for hosts to 
perform revenue management? 
 
3) What differences can be discerned from host pricing practices, and how does it relate 
to previous research into sharing willingness? 
 
 
1.4 Theoretical and practical contribution 
Previous research has examined consumers’ willingness to participate in sharing, and sought 
to classify users based on that willingness. Previous research seems not to have examined 
revenue management from the point of view of sharing economy businesses, which provides 
a research gap for theoretical contribution. This thesis pursues to examine sharing economy 
revenue management quantitatively. This approach facilitates examining revenue 
management maturity in different geographical locations and different cultures.  
 Practical contributions look to provide recommendations for business managers and 
future entrepreneurs that may look to use a sharing economy business model as basis for 
their service. Especially integral for them will be the conclusions of possible pitfalls in 
facilitating consumer-dependent revenue management.  
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1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis will consist of the three parts. In chapter two I will dive into the current academic 
literature on the topic including: yield management, pricing schemes, definitions of sharing 
economy and more. In the following chapter I will discuss the methodology employed in 
approaching Airbnb data, Hotel prices and data limitations. After this I will present my 
findings from the data and engage in discussion of what the implications are and avenues for 
future inquiry based on the findings and my written analysis. Finally, in the fifth chapter I 
will present the concluding thoughts of this study. 
 
 
  
Literature review 5  
 
 
2 Literature review 
The purpose of this section is to discuss previous research on relevant topics, draw parallels 
between ‘traditional’ and disruptive business models and provide a framework with which 
to approach the empirical section of this thesis. Sections in the literature review are divided 
according to topic, yet are integrally related to each other to build a frame through which my 
empirical contribution can be understood. 
2.1 Definitions of sharing economy 
2.1.1 Differences in terminology 
Sharing economy as a concept started to gain identification in the 2000s (Richardson, 2015). 
However, sharing itself is as old as humankind itself (Belk, 2014). As Richardson describes 
it, sharing economy is usually characterized as a form of exchange that takes place through 
an online platform. Huefner (2015) describes sharing economy as something that focuses on 
access to specific resources rather than having direct ownership or control of the resource. 
Other terms used to describe the same phenomenon include collaborative economy 
(Richardson, 2015), collaborative consumption (Botsman & Rogers, 2010) and commercial 
sharing systems (Lamberton & Rose, 2012; Akbar et al, 2016) when referring to the platform 
or ecosystem. Sharing economy and collaborative consumption are terms born in the Internet 
age and are terms used sometimes interchangeably. (Belk, 2014.) Belk pursued to distinguish 
the fine differences of sharing and lending. When you help a stranger by telling them the 
time of day or point them towards the train station, are you actually sharing something? Belk 
also mentions the often used ‘borrow’ as a euphemism for sharing (i.e. can I borrow a piece 
of paper.)  
Both Richardson’s (2015) and Belk’s (2014) descriptions of collaborative 
consumption encompass both non-profit and for-profit activities. Another description by 
Stephany (2015) brands sharing economy to pursue taking advantage of under-utilized assets 
and making them available online. These two descriptions converge in the sense that they 
both require an online market place to enable the subsequent transactions to take place. Belk 
discusses the online sharing of media (films, TV shows, games, music etc.), which in some 
cases is legal or illegal. For practical purposes it is safe to assume that illegal business 
activities are not included in the desired definition of sharing economy. 
Lamberton & Rose (2012) make a distinction between open and closed commercial 
sharing systems (CSS). In an open CSS a shared good is available to all consumers in 
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exchange of a compensation. However, in a closed CSS the restricted group is allowed 
access to the shared resource. This restriction stems from membership, relationship, etc. 
Akbar et al. (2016) posit that if a consumer is materialistic and possessive of goods, their 
participation in commercial sharing systems is restricted, but not entirely dependent on other 
characteristics of the consumer and specific resource. 
Collaborative consumption is a form of consumption in which people coordinate 
their use (Belk, 2014). However, a focus on the “joint” activity is not enough, as simply 
doing something together is not enough. Belk dismisses definitions that are more depictive 
of traditional sharing or lending, and determines the exchange of a fee or compensation to 
be necessary in the definition. Belk recognizes a difficulty in the popular car “sharing” 
enterprises such as Zipcar.com (or DriveNow in Finland), which may call themselves as 
commercial sharing ventures, but Belk defines them as pseudo-sharing and as short-term 
rentals. Other academic literature has also highlighted the difficulty in defining the 
boundaries of rentals and sharing economy. Modern car rentals can take place through an 
online website or platform, which would constitute an element described by Richardson 
(2015) i.e. it uses an online platform as marketplace for the transaction. However, using the 
definitions of Belk (2014) and Richardson (2015), a car rental business doing short-term 
rentals through an online platform would not be a “true” sharing economy business.  
Richardson (2015) posits the problem with ‘sharing’ part of the term: what 
constitutes as sharing and what does sharing promise for the economy. Richardson discusses 
the implication of sharing economy in the perspective of work-sharing and links the concept 
with terms such as gig, on-demand or crowd-sourcing economy. Sharing economy seems 
similar to crowd-sourcing economy in it that they both use in the company’s point of view 
external resources to reach their objectives. Richardson identifies that academic literature 
has identified the connection between sharing economy and its relation to changes in 
consumption. She identifies three elements of sharing economy in Airbnb: 1) an online 
platform as a marketplace, 2) transactions are peer-to-peer, 3) the service is access-based. 
The first element provides cost-reduction as prices go down as supply and demand grow. 
However, as Richardson points out, the latter two elements are not definitely set in all 
definitions present in academic literature. An access-based service would exclude services, 
which transfer ownership of a resource or service instead of just temporary access. On pure 
face value, this constitutes a better definition of “sharing” than with an exchange of 
ownership. A service where ownership changes had in quick succession could be better 
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classified as circular economy, where the focus is placed on the full lifecycle of a resource 
depending on further characteristics of the lifecycle.   
Belk (2014) and Richardson (2015) seem aligned in their definition that a rental firm, 
which does not enable peer-to-peer transactions, does not constitute a sharing economy 
business. Belk recognizes, however, that several car manufacturers have launched new 
business models, where consumers share the cars they use. The sharing is done either 
through the short-term rental mentioned before or through carpooling, which sounds more 
extensively a shared activity. Belk provides a reasoning for the companies to be doing these 
new business models, which erode their traditional business models. Instead of fighting the 
disruptive market changes, the companies have opted to embrace the disruption instead of 
the options flight-or-fight, which worked less than optimally for the film, music and 
publishing industries. As Huefner (2015) points out, traditional companies can remain viable 
and maintain their coverage if they adapt to the new circumstances. He predicts that peer-to-
peer sharing can become another way for traditional companies to provide their goods and 
services to their customers.  
The peer-to-peer element of sharing economy can be switched (Richardson, 2015). 
Therefore, as she points out the host can guest can easily swap places and the community of 
sharing economy requires a level of receptiveness in encountering strangers visiting your 
home. This creates a requirement for trust that requires structure built within the platform. 
Different ratings and safeguards help improve the performance and build trust in the 
platform (e.g. Richardson, 2015; McAfee & Brynjolfsson, 2016) 
Richardson discusses the way collaboration in the sharing economy plays a part, and 
more accurately the co-operation through sheer labor. This would imply that sharing a 
workforce would constitute a part of sharing economy. Crowdsourced labor could be 
characterized as the modern day freelancing, which, as Richardson points out as possible 
critique, acts as a way to splinter the workplace. Companies such as Uber benefit from the 
commissions they receive from their drivers, but reduce their own risk by not having to treat 
their drivers as employees and do not follow the regulations involved if they were.  
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2.1.2 Criticism of sharing economy as a concept 
Sharing economy has been branded as duplicitous (Richardson, 2015; Martin, 2016) and is 
considered at the same time a part of the capitalist economy and an alternative to it 
(Morozov, 2013). Botsman & Rogers (2010) have suggested that sharing economy can act 
as a balancing force on the forces that drive hyperconsumption in modern capitalism. 
Morozov (2013) posits that while sharing economy businesses maintain that the business 
concept is something that benefits everyone, another possible view is that sharing economy 
is a utopia, which in fact limits worker rights by reducing employees to freelancers. Sharing 
economy businesses have run into issues with existing market players looking to prevent 
their market entry and growth (e.g. Cusumano, 2015; Belk, 2014). 
Belk (2014) and Richardson (2015) have noted in their work that businesses have 
used the terms sharing economy, collaborative consumption or car sharing to describe their 
enterprises, while their business activities seem more like renting and outsourcing of work 
rather than “true sharing”. Further criticism has been placed on the way sharing economies 
actually affect consumption. Researches have pointed out the moral hazard similar to agency 
theory in sharing economy (Cohen & Kietzmann, 2014). Cohen and Kietzmann posit that 
the private sector has developed business models in order to address a market failure to 
deliver sufficient service level for consumers. 
Cusumano (2015) details his view on actions traditional companies should enact 
when dealing with disruptive sharing economy ventures. His view can be best described as 
the “fight” approach to market entrants. Cusumano details the pitfalls that Airbnb and Uber 
have built into their business models, when considering present day regulations and legal 
requirements. He directs companies to pursue balanced treatment through checks for 
violations in taxation, insurance policies, licensing issues etc. Cusumano mentions the court 
case from Germany, where Uber received a nationwide ban on its operation. The 
aforementioned actions are ways to make sure the playing field is the same for both types of 
companies – traditional and sharing economy businesses. However, regulations have been 
drafted with the current market players in mind, and as sharing economy defenders would 
argue, should not apply to sharing economy businesses.  
Cohen and Kietzmann (2014) discuss sharing economy from the point of view new 
mobility solutions. As mentioned earlier, their view is that new mobility solutions are meant 
to address a prevalent market failure, which causes congestion and time wasted moving from 
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one place to another. At core of the mobility solutions is to achieve a sustainable way of 
commuting.  
If Botsman & Rogers (2010) considered sharing economy as an alternative to 
hyperconsumerism, Morozov (2013) dubbed sharing economy as ‘neoliberalism on 
steroids’. Morozov’s point of view seems to be that in a sharing economy, workers’ rights 
deteriorate from what has been a status quo for the past decades and a delicate balance of 
rights and requirements between the employer and employee. In a sharing economy business 
model the self-employed entrepreneurs are not entitled into healthcare paid by the company, 
insurance benefits and bear the economic risk of an entrepreneur: business does not run while 
you are sick (Morozov, 2013). 
Aside from workers’ rights, the greenwashing-like touch in the discussion can be 
understood over the effects on consumerism. As pointed out by some researches a sharing 
economy business model in itself is not sustainable unless certain conditions are met. If the 
business model makes a resource more accessible through sharing, it most likely increases 
the use of said resource and if using that resource has an environmental effect, then sharing 
increases environmental strain (e.g. Scheepens et al., 2016).  Through car sharing a person 
may use a car more than that person would be able to drive without owning one. Therefore, 
the environmental effect is larger than it would have been had the person taken the bus 
instead. The underlying cause for this conclusion according to Scheepens et al. (2016) is the 
‘rebound effect’, which constitutes that when people save money due to some technological 
change for example, they spend that money on something else. The point made by Scheepens 
et al. (2016) is that if the new resource that is shared is either more environmentally friendly 
or is used more sustainably, then the sharing economy business model is truly beneficial for 
increasing sustainability. 
Sharing economy solutions can reduce the number of resources used, however. Take 
the previous example of car sharing: if ten people can use one car consecutively instead of 
buying ten cars, fewer resources go into manufacturing and transporting one car to the same 
part of the city instead of manufacturing and transporting ten cars. In this example, the total 
demand for cars is lower as people have the chance to share cars. Similar findings have been 
made in academic literature (e.g. Huefner, 2015). Huefner highlighted the future promise 
available through the development of driverless technology, which can open new avenues 
of boosting the sharing economy.  
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2.2 Sharing economy business models 
2.2.1 User dependent view 
Sharing economy business models are heavily dependent on the needs of the consumers on 
that market (Lamberton & Rose, 2012). Hellwig et al. (2015) identified four clusters of 
customers in the perspective of sharing economy. These clusters have varying opinions 
about sharing, willingness to share and reasons for doing so. Sharing opponents are found to 
be the second biggest group at 28%, which can be expected to include some materialistic 
consumers discussed in research by Akbar et al. (2016). Research by Hellwig et al. (2015) 
indicated that sharing opponents lacked motivation to participate in sharing economy 
business models. The challenge in light of Akbar et al. (2016) and Hellwig et al. (2015) is 
thus to identify product categories that sharing opponents most associate with resource 
scarcity and offer them suitable unique products. Akbar et al. (2016) posit that the offer of 
unique products can be enough to counter the sharing opponents’ lack of sharing motivation. 
This could be understood as caused by the limiting effect on consumption by the business 
model, which the researchers deem it to be. However, Akbar et al. (2016) identify that a need 
for unique consumer products increases the willingness to participate in a CSS, when they 
do not possess that product or a product of that category. This shared resource specific view 
is discussed further in the section 2.2.2.  
 Hellwig et al. (2015) detail their view on how to build sharing economy business 
models to be successful in appealing to different clusters of users. As mentioned before, 
sharing opponents can be difficult consumers to include in the business due to their aversion 
to sharing, yet is not impossible. The researchers have identified the key motivating drivers 
for the other user clusters, however. Essential difference between the groups is answered 
through the question on why they participate in sharing. Sharing idealists as a group consider 
sharing as natural and enjoy the social and emotional benefits associated with it. In contrast 
sharing pragmatists participate for the convenience and utility that sharing provides them. 
This can be understood as having access to resources that otherwise would be out of their 
price range, is too expensive to own or is impractical to own instead of sharing it with others.  
Sharing pragmatists can be seen as being close to sharing idealists in it that they both 
see it as something natural to do, and can be one reason why sharing pragmatists do not feel 
it necessary to demonstrate their ethical and responsible behavior purely for the image value. 
In contrast, the normative sharers look for opportunities to signal their effort to protect the 
environment and tackle excessive purchasing over sharing resources with others. Normative 
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sharers would be less likely to participate in sharing economy businesses, where the 
commercial sharing system does not facilitate external signaling or is not otherwise apparent 
on the outside that the person is participating in sharing economy. Further characteristics of 
these clusters identified by Hellwig et al. (2015) are detailed in the following table including 
the respective percentages of the portions of users in the researchers’ study.  
 
 
Table 1: Clusters of CSS user groups, associated characteristics and motivations. Drafted mostly from research by 
Hellwig et al, 2015 and with addition from Akbar et al, 2016. 
Cluster % Description of characteristics and motivations 
Sharing Idealists 30,5 Most often female (67.3%) 
Very sociable on social media 
Most generous and prone to reciprocity 
Does not expect tit-for-tat reciprocity 
Does not consider themselves short of resources  
 
Primary driver: Integrated motivation.  
Sharing is a natural thing to do. Emphasize social and 
emotional benefits. 
Least influential driver: Introjected.  
Overemphasis on practical utilitarian gain is alienating.  
Normative Sharers 30 Evenly men and women 
Most active on Facebook 
Generous 
Prone to tit-for-tat reciprocity 
Considers themselves short on resources 
 
Primary driver: Introjected. 
Sharing is socially desirable. Emphasize signaling value 
of sharing as ethical and responsible behavior.  
Least influential driver: Integrated. 
Business models not enabling signaling alienating.  
Sharing Opponents 28 More often men (57%) 
Not present in social media (55% not on Facebook) 
Not very generous, low motivation for sharing 
Low resource scarcity 
 
Primary driver: none 
Research by Akbar et al. (2016) suggests offering unique 
products to sharing opponents to bypass their lack of 
sharing motivation  
Least influential driver: Low sharing motivation across 
the board.  
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Sharing Pragmatists 11,5 Most often men (71.3%) 
Sociable with a rich social environment 
Low generosity and reciprocity 
Averagely prone to sharing 
Mostly white-collar workers with a full-time job 
 
Primary driver: Introjected. (however low) 
Sharing is a pragmatic thing to do. Emphasize 
convenience and utility. 
Least influential driver: Integrated 
Avoid overemphasis on signaling value of sharing. 
 
Considering the very different potential groups in the above, it would be fair to say that 
sharing economy business models require a good insight into who their users are and who 
they are looking to have as customers. Philip et al. (2015) highlight the reasons why people 
may feel uneasy at joining sharing economies due to the risks of negative reciprocity and 
even the inflexible design of P2P rental sites. Another barrier that businesses would have to 
overcome is the desire for owning things (Behrendt et al., 2013). Lamberton & Rose (2012) 
discuss the possibilities available for managers to create trust with their users and in affecting 
their perceptions of associated risk factors. However, as they point out, no theoretical 
framework exists to aid managers’ in marketing related challenges. Lamberton & Rose 
(2012) highlight that by designing parts of their sharing system and marketing 
communications accordingly, managers can affect the perceived risk of product scarcity. 
Product scarcity speaks to a user’s desire to have access to a product when they want, instead 
of having to wait.  
 
2.2.2 Shared resource based view 
 Hellwig et al. (2015) discuss the characteristics of items to be shared through 
economy as a potential way of determining why certain items are unsuited to be shared. They 
posit that the more relevant an item is to a person’s extended self, the less likely it will be 
shared. Extended self is characterized that a person unknowingly, intentionally or 
unintentionally regards a possession a part of themselves (Belk, 1988) and the continuous 
rise of digital goods and alternative focus points of possession has increased the ways people 
define their extended selves (Belk, 2013).   
Akbar et al. (2016) identify that sharing a resource with a high product-need-fit is 
best suited for sharing economy purposes. The reason for this is that depending of the 
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product in question, having just one may not be enough. If for example someone lists a 
screwdriver in a CSS, one specific screwdriver may not work with all of my furniture, 
therefore a screwdriver or other tools like it have a low product-need-fit. In the point of view 
of my empirical section, Airbnb apartments fill a specific need for accommodation, yet there 
are other determinants in selection and price determination when it comes to selecting a 
place to stay. I will describe these further in sections 2.4 and 2.5.  
 Scheepens et al. (2016) examine the shared resource with sustainability in mind. 
However, they note that certain products such as clothing or mobile phones are not especially 
suitable for shared use. They also make the example of two families needing a car: “when 
two families have a car and drive 25,000 km per year, and the life span of the car is 250,000 
km, they will need two cars per 10 years, regardless whether they share the cars or not” 
(Scheepens et al., 2016, p.258). From a consumer point of view this example disregards the 
monetary effect of sharing that car altogether. If both families purchase a car, both pay a 
large sum at year 0 instead of paying 50% of the car value at year 0 and again 50% at year 
5 when they purchase the second car together. Vogtländer et al. (2014) also state that when 
a sharing economy solution saves the user some money, the subsequent “rebound effect” 
potentially causes environmentally adverse consumption.  Scheepens et al. (2016) consider 
the characteristics of the shared product as such: “when products save energy in the use 
phase, but require higher upfront investment (e.g. an electric car), leasing is an important 
component in the business model.   
Scheepens et al. (2016) note that due to the nature of the resource being shared, the 
sharing users may show less concern about its maintenance, which increases the lifecycle 
environmental cost and burden. Their consideration is placed on the overall environmental 
impact, but one could expect this moral hazard to influence the individual leasing their asset 
for sharing. If the users handle the asset less carefully and with less concern for the 
cleanliness, the burden of managing the asset falls on the real owner. In line with the thoughts 
of Scheepens et al. (2016) that items such as clothing or mobile phones and Hellwig et al. 
(2015) that products part of the extended self are not suited for sharing, it could be a reason 
of the owner’s understanding and fear of the moral hazard: owners recognize that users may 
show disregard for a product that they hold dear, and are therefore unwilling to share that 
extended part of themselves. 
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Table 2: User propensity to share different categories of items divided by clusters of CSS user groups (using Likert 
scale 1 = share with nobody, 3 = only with reservations [wuth spouse, family, close friends], 5 = with everyone) 
Hellwig et al, 2015 
 Mean values (Likert scale 1-5) 
Variable Idealists Normatives Pragmatists Opponents 
Practical wisdom 4,40 4,19 4,05 3,97 
Nutrition 4,32 4,13 4,00 3,77 
Photos and music 4,04 3,81 3,83 3,49 
Households 3,44 3,16 3,23 2,83 
Personal 
belongings 
3,03 2,78 2,88 2,50 
Personal 
information 
2,08 1,91 2,09 1,78 
Intimates 1,42 1,35 1,53 1,29 
 
 Hellwig et al. (2015) examined in their research the sharing willingness of the user 
clusters in their research based on the category of shared resource. Their findings indicate 
that idealists and pragmatists are the similarly likely to share with the idealists more likely 
to share non-personal resources while pragmatists are more willing to even share personal 
information about themselves and intimates. The researchers determined 2,5 as the threshold 
for reserved sharing with others, i.e. sharing willingness under 2,5 is somewhat reserved (on 
a Likert scale 1-5). For my research in the empirical part, this table provides an interesting 
contribution as even sharing opponents are not reserved about sharing their households with 
others, which means that Airbnb users can belong into all four user clusters. However, the 
sharing opponents are the least likely of the four to share their household with someone. 
 Constantiou et al. (2017) examined sharing economy business models based on their 
offering from the perspectives of control and rivalry. The subsequent 2x2 table categorized 
sharing economy business models into 1) franchisers, 2) chaperones, 3) principals and 4) 
gardeners. The researchers identify Airbnb users as facing loose control from the platform 
owners, yet high rivalry. The rivalry mechanism in Airbnb is heightened due to not only 
competition between other disruptive hospitality platforms, hotel chains and traditional 
hospitality industry players, but also competition between the different Airbnb hosts. 
Constantiou et al. (2017) posit that hosts usually adopt the pricing recommendations set by 
Airbnb. In the perspective of my empirical section, this could be an interesting phenomenon 
to examine should the pricing of Airbnb accommodation prove either overly expensive, or 
very cheap and overly aggressive in pricing.  
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Table 3: Clustering of sharing economy business models by control and rivalry into four clusters. Constantiou et 
al. (2017) 
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2.3 Pricing decisions & revenue management 
2.3.1 Definitions 
Revenue management as a concept aims to sell the right product to the right customer at the 
right time (Yeoman & McMahon-Beattie, 2017). In the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the focus 
was on cancellations, no-shows and misconnections (Yeoman & McMahon-Beattie, 2017) 
and after the 70s this view was expanded to include data on advance bookings even 13 weeks 
before the event / flight / stay (Littlewood, 2005). The ‘Littlewood’ rule was expanded to 
become the foundation for airline revenue management systems (Belobaba, 1987). 
 At the core of revenue management is inventory control and yield management; and 
revenue management is interchangeably called yield management (Boyd & Bilegan, 2003). 
Inventory control aims to manage overbookings, avoid underbooking and in the perspective 
of yield management gain the highest profit of the seats in total. This means pricing airline 
seats or hotel rooms differently based on booking time and room / seat quality (Boyd & 
Bilegan, 2003; Yeoman & McMahon-Beattie, 2017). 
2.3.2 Yield management & dynamic pricing 
Challenges in performing yield management have much to do with dealing with demand 
uncertainty and perishability of products or capacity (Boyd & Bilegan, 2003; Perakis & 
Sood, 2006; Broderick, 2015). Retailers have proprietary algorithms crunching vast amounts 
of data and churning our prices that the consumer would be willing to buy (Broderick, 2015). 
Broderick states that dynamic pricing is constantly making its way to new industries. 
Software changes to prices according to parameters and even according to consumer 
websites to adjust prices in a matter of hours or even in a matter of minutes.  
 Revenue management systems that herald from the central reservation systems that 
logged in the sales of inventory at fixed price provide insight into customer purchasing habits 
and patterns. Baker & Collier (1999) examined data availability, data accuracy, forecast 
ability, computer capability and user understanding as criteria for understanding the process 
of forecasting demand. Contemporary systems employing even methods of machine learning 
have progressed in many of those factors since their research.  
 Much focus is placed on pricing on different fare classes (Boyd & Bilegan, 2003; 
Broderick, 2015). Similar considerations take place in hotels where hotel rooms charge 
different rates i.e. standard and deluxe rooms (Boyd & Bilegan, 2003). Challenge is caused 
by the existing dependency of demand between fare classes (Boyd & Bilegan, 2003). As 
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detailed by Boyd & Bilegan (2003) about the misunderstood nature of yield management 
and dynamic pricing, should a fare class sell out day X then perhaps only more expensive 
classes are left for sale on day X+1. To customers this may appear as if dynamic pricing 
would have set the price higher, when in fact the price class is no longer available.  
 Examining revenue management is different based on the industry. While the airline 
industry is focused on maximizing profits per flight leg, hotels look to maximize profit from 
guests staying varying periods of time. Boyd & Bilegan (2003) discuss the challenge as 
hotels may receive many short duration bookings that block long duration stays and leave 
gaps in between guests.  
2.3.3 Consumer dependent pricing 
Krämer et al. (2017) discussed in their research the customer driven pricing mechanisms that 
they dubbed as Pay What You Want (PWYW) and Name Your Own Price (NYOP). They 
posit that the mentioned pricing strategies have been used in the past to good effect to 
achieve successful market entry. However, they note that both PWYW and NYOP have 
shortcomings especially when competing against in each other. In the context of hospitality 
industry the above pricing strategies can be employed to sell excess capacity when fixed 
costs are high (Krämer et al., 2017). Achieving some sales, which cover the variable costs 
can help off-set losses when capacity is not fully utilized with perishable products and 
services.  
PWYW makes it possible for a customer to pay zero, which in turn allows for 
monopolizing the market. In contrast, NYOP uses thresholds for acceptable prices that the 
buyer suggests and the seller can choose to accept when the price is within their acceptable 
range. This pricing strategy allows sufficient market penetration, but yields higher profits 
(or limits losses.) Krämer et al. (2017) note that the pricing strategies mentioned in the 
previous chapter can be used to promote a company’s offering to a wider audience. However, 
some friction between seller and buyer exists, when the seller is employing a PWYW pricing 
strategy. Buyers can be unwilling to purchase from a PWYW seller due to the discomfort 
associated with the price setting i.e. how much is a fair price instead of me being greedy type 
of scenario. The authors posit that direct promotional benefits alone are not sufficient to 
making a PWYW pricing model profitable.  
There are some geographical differences to the feasibility of the two pricing 
strategies. A chief executive of Priceline (company known for its use of NYOP) has stated 
in the Wall Street Journal that a NYOP pricing model does not work as well in Asia and 
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Europe compared to the United States (Morrison, 2010). The executive cites uncertain levels 
of quality and consistency as contributing factors to the difference between the markets.  
While the previous pricing methods are dependent on consumers determining the 
price, another consideration is the transparency that consumers receive of the prices they pay 
– or set. Yeoman & McMahon-Beattie (2017) posit that as the dynamics of pricing are more 
and more visible to consumers through price comparison websites and highly responsive 
websites and smartphone applications, customers are able to seek the best price available. 
They also note that nearly every hotel has a revenue manager (Yeoman & McMahon-Beattie, 
2017), and Airbnb has a pricing algorithm that aids hosts in setting their prices (Steinmetz, 
2015; Hill, 2015). There are, however, indications that Airbnb hosts are not satisfied with 
the transparency of the price recommendations that the platform provides, nor the level the 
platform suggest they charge their guests. Gibbs et al. (2017) highlighted the need for further 
education about pricing as needed from Airbnb. Example of frustrated users in the Appendix 
section is included in the appendix section (Picture C1). Furthermore, article by Hill (2015) 
indicates that their pricing tool provides a recommendation every day, yet it seems to require 
manual interaction from the host to accept the new suggested price. Dynamic pricing could 
be expected to perform this automatically instead of expecting hosts to check-in frequently 
to accept price suggestions. This could indicate that transparency in prices is not important 
only to the buyer but also the seller side. 
Article by Steinmetz (2015) examined the released Airbnb pricing tool and 
mentioned an uncited Airbnb report that hosts that manually set their price within 5% of the 
Airbnb recommendation increased their likelihood of getting a booking by four times over. 
However, as mentioned by Steinmetz, the sweet spot can change quickly and furthermore if 
the bookings increased by four times over, does not necessarily mean the price is maximizing 
profits instead of occupancy rate. Neither of the articles provide insight into the customer-
specific targets of occupancy, which may be lower and offset with a higher charged price 
for stay.   
2.3.4 Predatory pricing 
Predatory pricing is a highly debated subject in business practices and in competition policy 
(Niels & ten Kate, 2000). Recent occurrences (and perhaps the only one) in predatory pricing 
in Finland include the case against Valio’s pricing of milk (Yle.fi, 2016; Talouselämä, 2016; 
Maaseudun Tulevaisuus, 2017). In the court case the Finnish dairy company was charged 
with a fine of €70 million for predatory pricing, by setting the price of milk below variable 
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costs. Valio held the view that costs to account for in the pricing should be held at market 
value instead of the view held by Finnish competition authorities that basic milk should 
account for 70% of the purchasing expenses of raw milk. (Talouselämä, 2016). Media 
relayed the image of a company, which forces competition out of the market. Niels & ten 
Kate (2000) state that competition has a tendency to complain to authorities for undercutting 
their prices and that steps have been taken in the past, which protect new entrants over 
economic efficiency. 
 Common criterion for definition among academic literature on predatory pricing is 
that it requires some form of below-cost pricing – and sometimes cases even above costs 
(Niels & ten Kate, 2000). The authors discuss the way in which companies can charge lower 
rates in one market, while charging higher rates in another (also called cross-subsidization). 
Current market players in taxi and hospitality industries have blamed disruptive sharing 
economy companies of undercutting their prices through circumventing regulatory demands. 
Hypothetically, it can be difficult to charge a sharing economy business of predatory pricing. 
Should the company give their users full authority to set the price they wish, would the 
company be expected to pay the penalties for a possible breach in fair competition? 
 Niels & ten Kate (2000) posit that a company’s willingness to engage in predatory 
pricing constitutes an entry barrier and also an exit barrier for current market players. Prices 
would shift to a higher level after a possible entry is deterred and those remaining in the 
market can return to a higher price level. Considering the views presented in the previous 
two chapters, curious future research could be conducted on how cheap computing power 
can affect competition and prices. Should a sharing economy company exist in market across 
the globe, the company can enjoy scale benefits that market entrants can find extremely 
difficult to overcome. Companies such as Google and Facebook have caught the eyes of 
people looking to break up the companies as natural monopolies (New York Times, 2017a). 
Should sharing economy businesses rise to matchings heights in their successes, and a world 
order with reduced individual ownership take hold, how should these businesses be 
regulated?  
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2.4 Factors affecting prices in hotel industry 
Several studies have been conducted in the past decades into hotel pricing determinants 
(Wang & Nicolau, 2017). Wang & Nicolau (2017) have categorized hotel price determinants 
into five categories listed in table 4. These categories are 1) site-specific characteristics, 2) 
quality-signaling factors, 3) hotel services, 4) property characteristics and 5) external factors. 
Some of these determinants have a positive effect on price, and others can have a negative 
impact based on conditions. Their research confirms many of the commonly accepted truths 
such a link between higher prices and proximity to a focal point in a city such as transport 
hub or tourism hotspot. However, the determinants mentioned work to make the hotel the 
chosen location for a traveler, other factors affect the total number of travelers to a location 
in general. Thus, normal rules of supply and demand apply and the more travelers you have 
travelling to a location, the higher the pressure of raising prices. This pattern can be observed 
in the graph below of hotel prices in London during (2015-2017). Additional figures can be 
found under the appendix section. 
 
Figure 1. Price variation between high & low demand months in London. Source: Trivago 
Wang & Nicolau (2017) noted that past research identified regional differences 
between the price determinants as to what the effect of offering a specific amenity, or the 
existence of parking or Wi-Fi has on the hotel pricing. The offering of amenities are mostly 
associated with an increase in pricing. Laundry services, however, affect prices negatively 
and provision of Wi-Fi has a mixed effect on prices. The researchers posited that newer 
hotels (budget hotels) carry lower prices and provide free internet, while older more 
traditional hotels charge extra for using Wi-Fi.  
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Table 4: Summary of hotel price determinants 
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2.5 Factors affecting prices in Airbnb accommodation 
The effects of Airbnb listings on demand for hotel rooms is not fully understood, yet it has 
been identified that Airbnb does affect lower-end hotel accommodation more than high-end 
establishments Zervas et al. (2014). Research by Wang & Nicolau (2017) detailed the 
determinants that affect the prices of traditional hotels and examined the differences 
compared to Airbnb accommodation. For example the quality-signaling factors are different 
between the two, as Airbnb hosts act as individual entrepreneurs and are not chain affiliated 
nor are they awarded stars but are instead reviewed by the users. However, an integral link 
is identified through customer ratings, which played a significant role in not only price 
determination but also future bookings. Wang & Nicolau (2017) state that cheaper listings 
receive more bookings and consequently receive more ratings, which contributes to an 
identified negative effect of their variable “reviews per year”. 
 Wang & Nicolau (2017) provide a detailed listing of determinants that either affect 
positively or negatively the Airbnb accommodation prices. These determinants have 
differences based on geographical location. For example, whether the host is a superhost or 
not has more importance in France than elsewhere. Similarly, the offering of breakfast with 
accommodation in Austria and France is not linked with a negative effect on price. This is 
contradictory to the status quo elsewhere in the world. Interestingly breakfast has the 
opposite effect on hotel prices. 
Table 5: Determinants on Airbnb and hotel prices according to Wang & Nicolau  (2017).  
Determinant Effect on Airbnb prices Effect on hotel prices 
Breakfast Negative Positive 
Internet access Positive Mixed (newer cheaper 
hotels provide internet, 
traditional hotels may 
charge extra) 
 
Distance to focal point Negative (when further 
away) 
Negative (when further 
away) 
Customer ratings Positive Positive 
Free parking Positive Positive 
Stars  N/A or not in the study Positive 
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Chain affiliation N/A or not in the study Mixed (some regions 
demonstrate a negative 
effect, mostly positive) 
Superhost Positive N/A or not in the study 
Host profile picture Negative N/A or not in the study 
Verified host identity Positive N/A or not in the study 
Entire home/apartment Positive N/A or not in the study 
Private room Slightly positive N/A or not in the study 
Number of people 
accommodated 
Positive N/A or not in the study 
Bathroom Positive N/A or not in the study 
Real bed Positive N/A or not in the study 
Instant booking Negative N/A or not in the study 
Flexible cancellation Negative N/A or not in the study 
Smoking Negative N/A or not in the study 
Reviews per year Negative N/A or not in the study 
 
 As can be gathered from the above table detailing the findings of Wang & Nicolau 
(2017), most determinants have the same effect on prices (both Airbnb and hotel). Some 
determinants are incompatible or not identified separately in their research, yet they 
identified two inconsistencies between the two forms of accommodation. As mentioned 
earlier, breakfast has a negative effect on Airbnb prices, although listings that provide 
breakfast only represent 9% of the listings in their sample. Considering user groups of 
sharing in section 2.2 (by Hellwig et al., 2015) and the theory by Wang & Nicolau (2017) 
that these hosts are looking to please their guests more, this could be an indication of a group 
not primarily interested in their economic benefit. This consideration is further enhanced by 
the link identified by Wang & Nicolau (2017) that flexible cancellation and low price are 
strongly related (27% of the sample).  
 Wang & Nicolau (2017) identify a negative link between the number of reviews and 
Airbnb price. They consider this to be caused by lower price accommodation having the 
most guests, which contributes a higher number of reviews than pricier locations. This is 
similar in the top 10% of the listings, where the cheapest among them receive most reviews. 
An interesting pattern to research further could be to identify whether having none or very 
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few reviews contributes negatively in the booking rate of a location. This could force new 
hosts to lower the prices to reach the first bookings.  
2.6 Impact of Airbnb on the hotel industry 
Airbnb operates in the same markets as the hotel industry, but the effect on the industry itself 
is not fully understood (Zervas et al., 2014). While the previously mentioned authors only 
focus on Texas in their study, their findings provide an interesting view regardless of the 
limited representability of the wider phenomenon. Their research indicates that hotels that 
do not cater to business travelers are most affected by Airbnb listings. Therefore, the impact 
is not distributed evenly across the industry.  
 Zervas et al. (2014) indicate in their research that Airbnb listings in Texas is 
associated with lower returns for hotels. Their research reaches this conclusion by examining 
tax data from the state from the previous ten years and include Airbnb listing data from a 
previous five-year period.  
 Airbnb listings factor in an increase in supply on the market (Zervas et al., 2014).  
This in contrast to the demand side determinants examined in chapters 2.4 and 2.5 in this 
thesis. Furthermore, as Airbnb is in a growing phase and similar businesses are picking up 
speed, the effects are realized gradually (Zervas et al., 2014). They also consider in their 
research that many users have acted opportunistically when it comes to listing their property 
on Airbnb. People would therefore be taking advantage of low overhead costs of listing it an 
online platform (costs practically zero) and do not take care in weighing hotel performance 
in the area.   
 Yeoman & McMahon-Beattie (2017) discussed in their research the effect low-cost 
carriers (LCCs) had on legacy carriers. Legacy carriers faced severe cost cutting efforts to 
maintain financial viability, which eroded consumer perception of legacy carriers offering a 
better product. Boyd & Bilegan (2003) detailed the differentiation methods for hotels 
through free breakfasts, bathrobes and other amenities and Wang & Nicolau (2017) noted 
the positive effect of chain-affiliation on prices. Should Airbnb force hotels reduce their 
service level and included amenities, there exists a risk similar to the legacy carriers that 
perception of higher quality is eroded. A hotel aims to be a temporary “home” on your 
business journey or holiday, an Airbnb house / apartment often already is someone else’s 
home and may provide more of a feeling of being at home than a hotel in the future. Further 
research on this topic would be needed, however, to examine this possibility more closely.  
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2.7 Summary of literature review 
Topic Findings References 
Differences 
in 
terminology 
of sharing 
economy 
 Sharing itself is as old as humankind 
 Sharing economy gained identification in the 2000s 
 Different terms (collaborative consumption, sharing 
economy, commercial sharing systems) are used 
interchangeably 
 Sharing economy looks to take advantage of underutilized 
assets by making them online; either in open (public) or 
closed (restricted) sharing 
 Peer-to-peer sharing may become a new way for traditional 
companies to do business 
Belk (2014), 
Richardson (2015), 
Lamberton & Rose 
(2012), Huefner 
(2015) 
Criticism of 
sharing 
economy 
 Sharing economy is more similar to short-term rentals and 
lending rather than true sharing 
 Traditional companies face an unlevel playing field, results 
in fight-or-flee situations 
 Sharing an alternative to hyperconsumerism or 
neoliberalism on steroids? 
 Sharing increases the use of an asset which may have 
negative environmental impact depending on the asset i.e. 
the rebound effect 
Belk (2014), 
Richardson (2015), 
Cusumano (2015), 
Botsman & Rogers 
(2010), Morozov 
(2013), Scheepens et 
al., (2016) 
Sharing 
economy 
business 
models with 
a user 
dependent 
view 
 Business model is heavily dependent on consumer needs in 
the target market 
 Hellwig's clustering of users (normatives, opponents, 
pragmatists & idealists) based on characteristics and 
motivations 
 A consumer's materialism (desire to own things) is a 
hindrance to sharing participation 
 Managers can affect the perceived risk of shared resource 
scarcity by designing the system can communication 
carefully 
Lamberton & Rose 
(2012), Hellwig et al. 
(2015), Akbar et al. 
(2016), Behrendt et 
al., (2013) 
Sharing 
economy 
business 
models with 
a resource 
dependent 
view 
 Offering unique products can also capture also materialistic 
consumers in the business model 
 Extended self limits sharing willingness 
 Sustainability comes from saving energy in the use phase 
over old product, rebound affect still applies, however 
 Sharing willingness in Hellwig's user clustering is 
dependent on resource category and cluster 
Akbar et al. (2016), 
Hellwig et al. (2015), 
Belk (1988), 
Scheepens et al. 
(2016), Vogtländer et 
al. (2014), 
Constantiou et al. 
(2017)  
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 Sharing economy business models can be categorized by 
examining the level of rivalry and control they face 
Pricing and 
revenue 
management 
 Revenue management and dynamic pricing often 
mistakenly used interchangeably 
 Revenue management deals with pricing capacity in 
different classes, while dynamic pricing adjusts the prices 
overall 
 Revenue management looks to sell the right product to the 
right customer at the right time 
 Since the 50s, 60s and 70s, revenue management has dealt 
with cancellations, no-shows and misconnections and has 
since expanded to include data on advance bookings 
 Challenge in yield management is dealing with demand 
uncertainty and product or capacity perishability 
Boyd & Bilegan 
(2003), Yeoman & 
McMahon-Beattie, 
(2017), Boyd & 
Bilegan, (2003), 
Perakis & Sood, 
(2006), Broderick, 
(2015) 
Consumer 
dependent 
pricing 
 Consumers determine the prices they want to pay in Pay 
What You Want (PWYW) and Name Your Own Price 
(NYOP) pricing models, PWYW enables extremely high 
market penetration, however, even promotional benefits 
cannot make it profitable in the long run 
 Consumers pursue transparency in pricing, and modern 
systems offer greater access to information 
 Airbnb users that set their price within 5% of the price 
recommendation increase booking likelihood by four times 
over 
Krämer et al. (2017), 
Yeoman & 
McMahon-Beattie 
(2017), Hill (2015), 
Steinmetz (2015)  
Predatory 
pricing 
 Predatory pricing remains a highly debated subject in 
business practice and competition policy 
 Companies have a tendency to complain to authorities for 
undercutting their prices 
 Past steps which have been undertaken in markets have 
served to protect new entrants over economic efficiency 
 Defined as below-cost pricing, cases of above costs have 
been prosecuted as well 
Niels & ten Kate 
(2000), various media 
outlets 
Hotel price 
determinants 
 Determinants distributed into three categories: 1) site-
specific characteristics, 2) quality-signaling factors, 3) hotel 
services, 4) property characteristics and 5) external factors 
 Proximity to a focal point such as transport hub or tourism 
hotspot have a positive effect on prices 
 Regional differences persist and certain amenities have a 
mixed effect on price 
Wang & Nicolau 
(2017)  
Literature review 27  
 
 
Airbnb price 
determinants 
 Airbnb price determinants are not fully similar to hotel 
price determinants (some are not applicable and others have 
divergent effect on price) 
 User groups may influence Airbnb offering and 
consecutively on pricing 
 Users with lower prices get the most bookings and more 
reviews 
Zervas et al. (2014), 
Wang & Nicolau 
(2017), Hellwig et al. 
(2015) 
Impact of 
Airbnb on 
hotel 
industry 
 Airbnb's effect on the hotel industry is not fully understood, 
however Airbnb listings (in Texas) affects the lower-end 
hotels' profits the most 
 Airbnb listings constitute a supply side shock, which 
increases competition 
 Airbnb and similar businesses are still at growth stage and 
effects are realizing gradually 
 People have behaved opportunistically and may not fully 
understand their own cost structures and those of their hotel 
competitors 
 Low-cost carriers had a strong effect on the viability of 
legacy carriers and on the consumer trust of them offering a 
superior product 
 Hotel differentiation may change due to Airbnb's influence, 
would this have a similar effect as with airlines 
Zervas et al. (2014), 
Yeoman & 
McMahon-Beattie 
(2017), Boyd & 
Bilegan (2003), 
Wang & Nicolau 
(2017)  
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Chosen approach 
This thesis will approach the research problem with a quantitative data analysis based on 
available data on Airbnb listings, bookings and price data through Insideairbnb.com and will 
be aggregated using SQL to provide data sets for analysis and graphs for visualizing key 
findings (processing of data detailed in Figure 2). Twelve cities across the globe have been 
selected for the comparison, which represent major cities in Northern America, Western 
Europe and Australia. Hotel data for the comparisons are from Trivago hotel price indices, 
which detail monthly averages for two person hotel rooms. 
 Meredith (1998) has defined that case studies can employ multiple methods and tools 
for data collection to consider both temporal and contextual elements of the studied 
phenomenon. Yin (2009) has described a case study as a way to review new or unclear 
phenomena while maintaining a holistic real-life view. Meredith (1998) and Yin (2009) have 
identified financial data and other organizational charts as potential sources for intelligence 
– among others. This research is limited into the hospitality industry as comparing data 
between industries is beyond the chosen research scope. This research will look to explain 
potential differences in price setting between traditional firms and sharing economy business 
models and will thus be a comparative case study. Airbnb is selected to be the focus due to 
its leading status in the industry and will be compared to an aggregated view of hotels 
through a price index. 
 Meredith (1998) has identified that case studies can employ both quantitative and 
qualitative approaches. Empirical data for the research is derived from Airbnb listing 
calendar data, which is aggregated to allow for identifying host tendency to set different 
prices at different times. This data is then compared to hotel price index data by matching 
the two data sources to examine the price deviations. The benefit of using the above approach 
is the large data sample with which to analyze Airbnb pricing, and the aggregated results 
provided by one of the largest online hotel booking websites (Trivago). 
 Eisenhardt (1989) and Glaser & Strauss (1967) discuss the divergent purposes of 
sampling and statistical sampling. According to them statistical sampling aims at obtaining 
accurate statistical evidence on distributions of variables within the population. Meredith 
(1998) discusses the way of increasing the generalizability of the study through testing the 
theory on alternative populations. My research will focus on populations across several 
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countries and continents even, which will provide a large geographical scope to understand 
the phenomenon more widely. However, this research will focus only on one industry. 
Ability of individual citizens (or hosts) to do pricing decisions in sharing economy 
is determined by examining price variation in several cities across the globe in the past 18-
24 months. Comparisons will be made between price variations by month in Airbnb and 
hotel accommodation. Changes in the average prices between months provides insight on 
citizens’ willingness and preparedness to adjust based on demand. This type of comparison 
highlights the extent of information and time that hosts have for setting their prices. 
The described method has some limitations that need to be taken into consideration 
in the data preparation phase, data analysis phase and when deriving conclusions. One key 
limitation is the nature of data available on insideairbnb.com. Instead of having a data set 
with all prices at which locations were rented, the data available provides detailed booking 
information for the next 12 months each Airbnb listing in each report. Some of these calendar 
dates are shown as 'free' noted by an 'f' or booked 't' (detailed further in Table 7). However, 
both the host and guest may cancel the reservation before the stay. These listing reports are 
available from each location as follows. 
Table 6: Data points and data point dates per city  
City # of data points, first and last data point dates 
Amsterdam 7 data points between April 2015 and April 2017 
Barcelona 7 data points between April 2015 and April 2017 
Berlin 19 data points between October 2015 and May 2017 
London 6 data points between April 2015 and March 2017 
Los Angeles 11 data points between May 2015 and May 2017 
Melbourne 8 data points between July 2015 and April 2017 
New Orleans 10 data points between June 2015 and June 2017 
New York City 27 data points between January 2015 and May 2017 
Paris 4 data points between May 2015 and April 2017 
San Francisco 7 data points between May 2015 and April 2017 
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Sydney 8 data points between May 2015 and April 2017 
Toronto 7 data points between June 2015 and June 2017 
 
This creates gaps between the data in certain cities, which requires using booking data from 
several months before the actual stay. Future research with more significant financial 
backing could use the reports sold by commercial companies, which charge up to $80 per 
report for each city. However, with 121 data points detailing the listings in each location 
(totaling in tens of thousands) with the full availability calendar of 365 days I am provided 
an extensive sample (500+ million rows of price data).  
Comparability between hotels and Airbnb accommodation has the caveat of very 
heterogeneous listings. Every hotel listing has different star ratings, some are in the city 
center while others are at the edge of the city. Airbnb listings are even more varied by being 
of all sizes that apartments can be. The accommodation can be a shared room, private room 
or an entire apartment or house. Therefore, a determination such as “hotel is cheaper than 
Airbnb” in a specific month in a city cannot be made definitively, nor is that the objective 
of this thesis. However, with locations in each city reaching tens of thousands and countless 
hotels in large cities, the effect of having a highly heterogeneous data mass is diluted.  
 
Table 7: Columns in raw data sets of Airbnb pricing and calendar booking information  
  
Airbnb raw booking data columns
Listings data file
id = ID of listed Airbnb accommodation (city-specific)
name Name of the Airbnb listing (user-given)
host_id ID of the listing's host
host_name Name of the listing's host
neighbourhood_group Region of the city
neighbourhood Sub-region of the city
latitude GPS coordinates
longitude GPS coordinates
room_type Type of accommodation (entire home/apt, private room, shared room)
price Price of stay
minimum_nights Minimum nights of reservation
number_of_reviews Number of reviews the listing has received
last_review Date of last review
reviews_per_month Number of reviews per month
calculated_host_listings_count Number of listings the host has available for rental
availability_365 Approximation of how many days the listing is available
Calendar data file
Listing_ID = ID of listed Airbnb accommodation (city-specific)
Date Calendar date for booking
Available Identifier (f or t) for whether the listing has been booked/taken = t, or is free for booking =f
Price Price of stay for booked night (value null if Available = f)
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Figure 2. Description of steps taken to process raw data for analysis in section 4  
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3.2 Description of Airbnb’s business model & market situation 
Airbnb is a company founded in 2008 for acting as a marketplace to offer locations for short-
term rental (Airbnb.com). Private citizens can list their property on the marketplace (today 
also professional lodging has appeared on the website), where other people can browse for 
a location to stay during their holiday, business trip, weekend away, etc.  
Airbnb allows the hosts, who rent their apartment set the price they wish to charge 
their guests, and Airbnb takes a percentage of that price. The company has developed their 
pricing mechanism along the years, and it provides hosts a recommendation – or tip – on 
what the price for a specific date could be. Ultimately the decision to select the price is left 
with the host, however. Several new businesses have emerged around Airbnb to provide 
hosts with an extended set of tools and automation even to manage their listed 
property/properties more effectively and promise higher returns on their listings. What this 
would suggest, and I will discuss further in the literature review section is that Airbnb’s 
pricing tool is incomplete and lacking in transparency – especially for more professional 
hosts. 
Airbnb has faced considerable opposition from hotel chains, who feel that the startup 
turned international phenomenon is in violation of the law, avoids taxation and is in non-
compliance of regulations placed on the hospitality industry across the world. As described 
by them this unleveled playing field between hotels and Airbnb results in a lower overhead 
and variable cost for Airbnb hosts, which enables them to undercut hotel prices.  
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4 Findings and discussion 
In this section I will discuss the key findings based on the Airbnb rental booking and price 
data and provide visualizations of the data.  
4.1 Data overview 
4.1.1 Managing Airbnb price data 
Data files available for download through Insideairbnb.com give access to files with 
differing content. In this analysis, the bulk of data is derived from the calendar data files. 
Calendar data files contain the columns Listing_ID (Airbnb rental location specific), 
calendar date, identifier signaling whether the listing is booked or free for the specific date 
and finally the price of the rental in local currency.  
 Calendar data is saved in individual .csv files, which are ported to be managed in 
SQL (each file has rows from a few million to tens of millions). Unnecessary rows (calendar 
dates of listings with no bookings and subsequently no price data) are deleted from the data 
and data from separate .csv files is merged into a single SQL table with the most current 
price information available. Additionally, another table is created where the monthly 
maximum, minimum, average and standard deviation values are calculated per month for 
each listing.  
Another course of analysis is enabled by calculating average prices in each of the 
calendar.csv files. This enables analyzing whether the price is higher or lower closer to the 
actual stay.  
Second data source contains an overview of listing in each city location. This data 
file is used in this research to describe the different categories of listings. The file’s 
information is not merged in this research with the data of the first file due to time and 
resource constraints. Thus, an accepted variance is to be accepted within the research: 
Airbnb listings are not differentiated in the research whether they are shared rooms, private 
rooms or entire apartments. Private rooms and entire apartments represent the bulk of the 
listings as detailed in the graphs below. Respective percentages of each accommodation type 
have developed during the analysis period. 
Findings and discussion 34  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of accomodation type by city (status at end 2016 / early 2017) 
The listing file also enables ascertaining how Airbnb has developed in each of the 
cities in terms of growth rate. Other variables could be analyzed in subsequent research, but 
are not discussed in this thesis. More detailed tables and graphs of the cities are available 
under the appendix section. 
Table 8: Summary of change in accommodation type in each city (change in percentages) 
 
  
Entire 
home/apt
Private 
room
Shared 
room
Growth
Amsterdam -2 % 2 % 0 % 93 %
Barcelona -9 % 8 % 1 % 44 %
Berlin -10 % 10 % 0 % 25 %
London -2 % 2 % 0 % 193 %
Los Angeles -1 % 0 % 2 % 62 %
Melbourne 5 % -5 % 0 % 126 %
New Orleans 6 % -6 % 0 % 108 %
New York -9 % 9 % 0 % 49 %
Paris 2 % -2 % 0 % 95 %
San Francisco -1 % 3 % -2 % 61 %
Sydney 2 % -3 % 0 % 145 %
Toronto -1 % 1 % 0 % 109 %
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4.1.2 Trivago hotel price indices 
 
Airbnb data is compared to hotel price indices drafted by Trivago for years 2015-2017 by 
month. Trivago has calculated the average prices for hotel rooms in several locations across 
the globe. In the calculation they have counted the average price for a two-person room. 
Comparison of hotel and Airbnb rooms would be difficult due to different room sizes, 
countless locations. Thus, deriving findings about which is cheaper is not a possibility, 
however nor is it a point of interest in this research. What is, however, observable from the 
visualized statistics how hotel prices have evolved and greatly reduced in the timeframe 
2015-2017 in locations such as Amsterdam, London and Paris. Further examination should 
be performed before making further statements, as these three locations have all experienced 
recent terrorist attacks, which may have affected passenger flows. Growth rates are not 
consistent across locations, however. Further tables are included in the Appendix section.  
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Figure 4. Hotel price indices detailing price variation across locations in 2015-2017. Source: Trivago 
 
 The data will be used to derive views that provide answers to the research questions. 
Graphs and views will be drafted to show whether Airbnb prices rise similarly to hotel prices 
(higher prices the closer the actual date is). Secondly, to show how much Airbnb prices 
adjust based on demand high- & low-points and thirdly to detail what the proportions of 
hosts that do active revenue management either by themselves or by using third-party tools. 
However, as this study is quantitative in nature and the data source does not provide a way 
of determining whether a host is using third-party software to boost their revenue 
management, distinctions cannot be made between the two. By engaging in revenue 
management hosts are able to enhance their profits. Hellwig et al. (2015) and Akbar et al. 
(2016) detailed in their research user clusters that they identified as sharing economy users. 
I will hypothesize about these segments from the findings arrived at through this research 
and draw links between their research.   
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4.2 Airbnb price evolution 
Tables below detail how prices develop as the stay gets closer. The furthest data point is 12 
months our and closest data point is 0 months out. Difference to end price details what is the 
difference in average prices to the closest price information available for a stay (end price). 
Price evolution details the direction the price has developed since the last month’s average 
price.  
 Tables indicate that regional differences exist in terms of how prices develop, which 
has different implications. New York indicates a direction that is opposite to the general rule 
that comes to booking a hotel stay – booking early usually means saving money. Based on 
the data in 2016 and 2017, booking an Airbnb accommodation is best left until only a few 
months beforehand. Prices start at a high level (in 2016 price difference was over $10 from 
the final price 5-11 months before the stay). In 2017, the prices remained low or lower than 
the end price from 8-12 months before the stay and remaining higher than the final price 3-
7 months before stay. 
Table 9: Detailing price evolution in New York City during 2016-2017.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New York City
Months before stay 2016 & 2017 2016 2017 2016 & 2017 2016 2017
0 -0,93 -0,96 -0,88
1 -0,49 -1,25 0,88 -1,28 -2,75 1,16
2 0,81 1,55 -0,42 -5,37 -5,35 -5,39
3 6,72 7,90 5,03 -1,68 -2,61 -0,52
4 7,49 9,55 4,92 -0,36 -0,90 0,24
5 8,10 11,66 4,14 -1,66 -3,02 -0,29
6 8,87 14,26 4,02 0,52 -0,18 1,10
7 7,12 12,69 2,55 0,26 -0,76 1,03
8 6,39 13,17 1,31 -0,45 -1,83 0,59
9 7,23 15,91 0,73 -0,05 -1,23 0,83
10 7,05 16,50 -1,54 3,15 6,17 0,73
11 6,09 16,64 -2,55 6,03 20,10 0,75
12 -6,81 -7,33 -6,55
Difference to end price Price evolution
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Table 10: Detailing price evolution in Toronto during 2016-2017. 
 
4.3 Individuals’ pricing behavior 
The aggregated results from the twelve cities can be observed in the three tables below. 
(Note: totals for rows can exceed 100%) Standard deviation indicates the variation in prices 
in each of the Airbnb listings. Listings have bookings from January to December in each of 
the years excluding the latter half of 2017 (data included until May 2017) and from 2015 in 
some of the locations, which may contribute to the development detailed in the graph below. 
Data from Berlin and Melbourne do not include data of the dates in 2015, thus only ten 
cities’ data influence the figures for that year. 
 These figures indicate that a majority of people across cities engage in minimal 
revenue management with their yearly price deviation either zero or under ten (on average 
~70% of listings.) Interestingly, users that receive a lot of bookings demonstrate a higher 
price deviation on average than overall. What this could indicate is learning curve effects 
about pricing: hosts are able to price their listing more efficiently and able to reach a higher 
revenue with their listing. This assumption expects that hosts knowingly adjust their pricing 
higher to match demand spikes. This way they can receive higher profits during high-season 
and weekends. In contrast, they also would adjust prices lower to maintain booking level at 
times with low demand 
  
Toronto
Months before stay 2016 & 2017 2016 2017 2016 & 2017 2016 2017
0 6,43 2,61 8,98
1 -5,65 -5,65 0,08 2,54 -0,53
2 -11,58 -11,58 -2,40 -0,28 -2,93
3 -11,83 -11,83 -2,04 -2,04
4 -8,72 -8,72 -2,33 0,32 -2,99
5 -2,66 10,19 -6,94 -2,09 -0,14 -2,58
6 -2,55 -2,55 1,06 0,55 1,18
7 -0,14 -0,32 -0,09 -1,15 -0,14 -1,48
8 -2,02 0,14 -2,56 0,09 -1,62 0,95
9 -3,46 -0,55 -4,43 -1,46 -2,22 -0,69
10 -1,55 -7,64 4,55
11 -2,81 -0,46 -5,15
12 -3,60 1,25 -8,45
Difference to end price Price evolution
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Table 11: Aggregated figures on price deviation across the 12 cities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The above tables detail the average spread of standard deviation based on the number of 
bookings in the twelve cities. Large differences exist between locations, however. The 
contrast between locations is perhaps most felt by comparing the two charts below detailing 
the spread of standard deviation in Paris and New Orleans during 2016. In Paris across all 
booking activity levels, 75% - 80% of hosts show a yearly price standard deviation of less 
than ten. In New Orleans 18% - 30% show a price standard deviation or under ten while 
around 50% fall in the range STD ∈ [20, 50] and near 25% have a yearly price standard 
deviation of 50 or more. 
 
 
Figure 5. Chart detailing the spread of price standard deviation in Paris in 2016. 
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
All bookings 42,03 % 28,75 % 14,15 % 7,83 % 5,07 % 4,09 % 3,31 % 3,00 % 2,82 % 3,94 %
Listings with >90 bookings 33,79 % 30,58 % 16,68 % 9,02 % 5,95 % 4,74 % 3,70 % 3,22 % 2,95 % 4,45 %
Listings with >180 bookings 30,51 % 30,89 % 16,89 % 9,48 % 6,53 % 5,74 % 4,34 % 3,81 % 3,59 % 6,33 %
2015 - Percentage of listings with price deviation of
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
All bookings 39,00 % 31,48 % 13,71 % 7,69 % 5,12 % 4,20 % 3,42 % 3,11 % 2,86 % 4,39 %
Listings with >90 bookings 29,92 % 35,77 % 16,09 % 8,76 % 5,67 % 4,47 % 3,66 % 3,24 % 2,92 % 4,58 %
Listings with >180 bookings 26,57 % 36,47 % 17,21 % 9,29 % 5,95 % 4,73 % 3,85 % 3,33 % 2,97 % 4,71 %
2016 - Percentage of listings with price deviation of
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
All bookings 34,83 % 35,08 % 13,73 % 7,58 % 5,22 % 4,31 % 3,53 % 3,17 % 2,92 % 4,63 %
Listings with >90 bookings 25,89 % 38,09 % 15,94 % 8,65 % 5,98 % 4,76 % 3,89 % 3,43 % 3,12 % 5,32 %
Listings with >180 bookings 25,31 % 37,11 % 16,04 % 8,87 % 6,24 % 4,97 % 4,06 % 3,59 % 3,19 % 5,69 %
2017 - Percentage of listings with price deviation of
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Figure 6. Chart detailing the spread of price standard deviation in New Orleans in 2016.  
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I previously discussed the possibility of learning curve effects with hosts that receive more 
bookings than overall. The chart below examines the development of average price standard 
deviations across the twelve locations. As discussed earlier, the years 2016 and 2017 contain 
data from twelve locations and 2015 contains the data of ten cities, which should not be 
disregarded when analyzing the results. A clear trend does, however, seem apparent by 
comparing these three years together. As each year passes hosts with more than 90 bookings 
seem increasingly conscious about performing revenue management. The same trend holds 
for those with over 180 bookings per year. 
 
 
Figure 7. Detailing the evolution of revenue management in the twelve cities during 2015-2017. 
 
In the table on the following page is a compilation of the twelve different locations. The 
table details the percentages of listings with under 90 bookings during 2016, over 90 
bookings during 2016 and over 180 bookings during the year. Detailed in the table are also 
the average price standard deviation in that city during 2016 and the price standard deviation 
based on Trivago’s hotel price indices. By examining the percentage of users reaching these 
levels, we can ascertain how active hosts are in those locations, which combined with the 
information about bookings and price deviation detailed earlier, facilitate in deriving 
conclusions about the data. 
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Table 12: Summary of the twelve locations detailing host data characteristics 
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Notable in the data is the variance between the twelve cities with some locations prominent 
with occasional hosts with less than 90 bookings during the year such as New York 
(73,5%), Berlin (72,5%), Amsterdam (58,7%), London (57,75). Comparatively some 
locations show booking levels where hosts book their listing for 90 days or more per year: 
Paris (56,3%), Barcelona (51,2%), Los Angeles, New Orleans (49,7%). When considering 
the findings by Lee (2016) about inhabitants of Los Angeles no longer renting their 
apartment solely to pay for rent, instead making money while doing so, the cities 
mentioned first could be understood as emphasizing small earnings instead of the second 
group, which rents out a location more often solely for extra profit that is not necessary to 
pay for rent.  
 Interestingly, on average half of the cities indicate that Airbnbs have a higher 
standard deviation than hotels (Barcelona, Berlin, Los Angeles, New Orleans, Paris and 
Sydney.) Meanwhile locations such Amsterdam, London, Melbourne, New York, San 
Francisco and Toronto show higher price variation. In the cities where hotels’ revenue 
management creates very strong seasonal differences compared to Airbnb the hotels adjust 
their prices on average 17 euros / dollars more.  
 Four cities (Berlin, Paris, Barcelona & Los Angeles) show a very high polarization 
within the host mass, where a very small number of listings (4,79%-11,25%) reach the 
average Airbnb price standard deviation or overall (4,79% - 31,18%). Similarly, a minority 
of hosts reach the levels of price variation that hotels boast (3,9% - 37,81%). This means 
that the majority vary their prices very little in these cities compared to the few who list 
their properties often and adjust their prices based on their expectation of demand. When 
you examine the four locations Berlin has the highest percentage of listings that are booked 
for under 90 days per year (72,5%) while the other three are among the locations more 
often booking their listings for 90 days or more. Therefore, the previously considered 
learning curve effect is not persistent in all locations, or the hosts in different locations 
have divergent attitudes towards using Airbnb and participating in sharing economy.  
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4.4 High-level comparison between hotels and Airbnb 
Based on the graphs derived from Airbnb pricing data and the visualized hotel price indices, 
one can determine the following conclusions. Airbnb users on average do not adjust their 
pricing as intensely as hotels do based on demand fluctuations. Although some similarities 
can be discerned from the graphs for example in New Orleans in spring 2016 where both 
hotels and Airbnb prices converge with similar intensity – and reaching similar price range. 
Another noteworthy aspect can be discerned from the distance between the two graphs from 
each other on the Y-axis: Airbnb accommodation is not priced as aggressively in some 
locations. This can indicate two things: 1) there are listings in the data set that skew the 
result, 2) certain locations around the world undercut hotel prices more aggressively than 
elsewhere. Of the twelve locations six cities show average hotel price and Airbnb price 
graphs that intersect in one or more time periods. 
 Based on the findings detailed in section 4.3 there exists a considerable portion of 
users that are somewhat passive in adjusting their pricing within a month, and a small portion 
that are highly aggressive in their pricing (around 2% adjust their prices within a month with 
a standard deviation of 50 or higher in Amsterdam, i.e. 50 euros). To examine this further a 
third line is added to the graph, which disregards the listings that have a small price standard 
deviation (between zero and ten). Overall this seems to have a minor effect in most cities on 
the intensity that the revenue management of Airbnb compares to hotel accommodation. 
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Figures 8. Detailing the differences in price variation between hotels and Airbnb accommodation. Average 
price of accommodation in hotel or Airbnb 
While the focus of this research is not to ascertain which is cheaper in each city – hotel or 
Airbnb – the figures on the previous page indicate very divergent practices between the 
cities. Hotel accommodation in New York is vastly undercut in Airbnb prices by a margin 
of 100 dollars a night or more. Possible reasons can be that hotels are enjoying huge 
premiums in these locations either to boost their profits or to cover their costs, which causes 
their prices to be high. Alternatively, Airbnb is engaging in aggressive pricing by giving low 
pricing tips that the hosts follow accordingly, or the Airbnb locations are most often outside 
the most expensive areas which brings down the prices considerably. When examining the 
Airbnb average price graph in London, New York and Paris; all three indicate a downward 
trend in overall prices and a possible explanation can be that Airbnb wishes to push prices 
down with cheap price tips or that the hosts are competing heavily against each other in these 
locations which drives the prices down. 
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 It can be noted, however, that Airbnb accommodation prices have some correlation 
with the pricing trends that hotels have. This serves to indicate that they follow the same 
demand patterns, although the magnitude that Airbnb hosts adjust their pricing is lower. 
When comparing the two Airbnb price lines, the line indicating the average price of hosts 
that have a yearly price standard deviation above ten euros / dollars remains consistently 
above the line averaging the entire data set. This indicates that hosts that adjust their prices 
more, also appear to charge more for the stay at their apartment.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Comparison of average price deviation between hotels and Airbnb aggregated for comparison 
between Europe (Amsterdam, Barcelona, Berlin, London & Paris) and North America (New Orleans, New 
York, Los Angeles, San Francisco & Toronto) 
 
By aggregating data from the five cities in Europe and the five cities in North America we 
can arrive at two conclusions: 1) hotels in America show a higher variance in prices during 
the year than in European hotels and 2) this gap is smaller when comparing Airbnb 
accommodation in Europe and North America.  
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4.5 Discussion 
In this chapter I will engage in discussion based on the findings in the previous four sections 
and provide answers to my research questions based on the empirical study. I will also 
discuss the limitations of the study scope and possible avenues for future research.  
 
 
What can be discerned from identifiable trends between Airbnb pricing and hotel 
pricing? 
 
Pricing trends affecting Airbnb listings prices indicate considerable city-specific variability 
and the study findings suggest similarity in terms of demand spikes. However, by examining 
cities such as London, New York and Paris and the low price-levels compared to the hotel 
price index the large gap begs the question: is Airbnb settings the price suggestions that hosts 
receive too low? This question has two interesting sides to it. Firstly, hosts that follow the 
suggestion set their prices too low and miss out on additional income that they could receive 
– even without performing yield management. Subsequently this causes the profits of hosts 
that set prices more accordingly to plummet as their prices are undercut by their Airbnb 
competitors which underscores the high rivalry classification posited for Airbnb by 
Constantiou et al. (2017). Secondly, it bears similarity to predatory pricing which is 
discussed in section 2.3.4. If the hosts are accommodating guests at minimal costs or maybe 
even below costs (hosts may not consider the opportunity costs for the time they spend), this 
highlights the uneven playing field between traditional hotels and hostels that face different 
regulatory standards and associated cost overheads.   
As discussed in section 4.2 the generally accepted notion that booking early in 
advance of your trip saves money in accommodation and flights. However, as is observable 
in the case of New York this does not hold as on average the price of stay falls in the last 
month(s) before the stay. A possible cause for this is that hosts that list their properties 
occasionally in Airbnb do not know their schedules several months in advance and list it as 
a last-minute option for travelers looking for budget options. The host may wish to get some 
extra money from their apartment should they be away from the city during the time of the 
stay and may settle for a smaller compensation than what is obtainable. Another possibility 
is that last-minute options do not get fully booked, therefore travelers have the opportunity 
to choose the cheapest options. Considerations by Gibbs et al. (2016) are divergent to these 
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findings as the researchers posited that occasional users would charge higher prices and vet 
their guests to offset the risk of Airbnb hosting. Further research could be conducted on the 
booking patterns: when do listings get booked and how far in advance and examine this 
phenomenon in further locations. 
 
 
Based on Airbnb rental booking and price data, how common is it for hosts to 
perform revenue management? 
 
By comparing the data derived from Trivago hotel price indices to the standard deviations 
achieved from Airbnb booking data we can come to the following conclusions: majority of 
hosts fall far short of the levels of revenue management that hotels do. Of the cities in the 
study New Orleans shows the lowest polarization between host with around third of the hosts 
reaching the average hotel price standard deviation. The other eleven cities fall in the range 
3,9% and 23,5% which indicates that very few hosts perform revenue management and yield 
pricing that is comparable to hotels in magnitude.  
 The implications of this should not be disregarded for future entrepreneurs and 
businesses seeking to implement a business model that is dependent on the individual setting 
the price on what they offer on a sharing economy platform (commercial sharing system). A 
business and individual misses out on profits that they could receive should they have 
sufficient support and knowledge of appropriate pricing. This of course is assuming that the 
Airbnb host is interested in maximizing their gain from their short-term rentals. As is 
observable in Table 11, hosts that rent their apartment out more during the year adjust their 
prices more actively than those who do not. This implies learning curve effects in price 
setting, but is also a consideration of time management: how much time is a host willing to 
put into managing their property on Airbnb. As discussed in my research, this extra effort to 
manage properties on Airbnb more effectively has created a business gap for entities such 
as Guesty and Beyond Pricing that enable Airbnb hosts to adjust their pricing more 
conveniently.  
Considering the regulatory details of the cities collected in Table 13, should Airbnb 
hosts be running an active business in their home &/ extra apartment(s)? If active revenue 
management can be considered an indicator of running a business in your apartment, this 
would then indicate that most people do not perform at that level at least – even if they intend 
to. As I discussed in the chapter 4.3 and showed in Figure 7, the trend shows that Airbnb 
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hosts are picking up speed on the revenue management side of things. Airbnb hosts should 
be aware of the limitations that regulation sets on their rentals and applicable taxation 
practices to avoid legal percussions, whether they perform active revenue management or 
not. 
 
 
What differences can be discerned from host pricing practices, and how does it 
relate to previous research into sharing willingness? 
 
Considering the research into Airbnb price determinants by Wang & Nicolau (2017) and 
clustering of users by sharing motivation by Hellwig et al. (2015) it seems clear that host 
characteristics play a part in their capability and willingness to extract higher prices with 
revenue management and yield pricing. Hellwig et al. (2015) noted in their research that 
different user clusters had varying opinions about reciprocity and generosity. Using their 
user clustering (detailed in Table 1) the hosts that are least generous would belong to the 
groups sharing opponents and sharing pragmatists. The total proportion of these two 
segments was 39,5% in the study. Based on the findings in section 4.3 it can be suggested 
that sharing pragmatists as named by Hellwig et al. (2015) are the hosts with the highest 
price standard deviation, as they seek to gain monetary benefits from participating in Airbnb 
apartment sharing. In contrast, the user clusters sharing normatives and sharing idealists 
(Hellwig et al., 2015 study proportion was 60,5%) represent Airbnb hosts that consider 
sharing a natural thing to do, and do not expect great economic benefit from doing it. Thus, 
they would be less inclined to perform revenue management due to their high generosity and 
reciprocity. 
 Research by Hellwig et al. (2015) indicated varying degrees of resource scarcity, 
which may contribute to the varying percentages across the twelve city locations. In cities 
where apartment prices are high, individuals with resource scarcity may feel pressed to rent 
out their apartment to afford the rent. Consecutively, this may also lead to apartment scarcity 
due to apartment owners preferring to rent on Airbnb instead of on a monthly-basis on 
normal rental markets due to higher price yields reached on Airbnb. This has effect on cities 
such as Los Angeles that face a housing crisis in affordable housing (Lee, 2016). 
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Table 13: Summary of the twelve locations detailing host data characteristics 
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4.6 Theoretical and managerial implications 
This research has provided new insight about the capabilities of individuals pricing their 
offerings in a commercial sharing system. Contradictory conclusions were reached about 
occasional users’ approach to pricing. Considerations by Gibbs et al. (2016) are divergent to 
the findings in this thesis as the researchers posited that occasional users would charge higher 
prices and vet their guests to offset the risk of Airbnb hosting. Conclusions reached in this 
thesis suggest that occasional users rent their properties a short time before the calendar date 
and rent at a low price. Further research should be undertaken the examine the reasons for 
this phenomenon further and seek additional verification. Furthermore, this research used a 
quantitative statistical data analysis to examine revenue management, which provides a new 
addition to research into sharing economies. 
  Managers can look to this research for insight into managing and selecting their 
business model for sharing economy. Regulators and other decisionmakers can use the 
thoughts in this thesis to further policy in creating a leveled playing field, and consider the 
needs of traditional and disruptive industry players separately.  
4.7 Limitations 
I have limited the research into the hospitality industry as comparing data between industries 
is beyond the chosen research scope. Following this limitation in scope, the data is derived 
from a traditional industry player and a disruptive one. Airbnb is selected due to its leading 
status in the industry and will be compared to an aggregated view of hotels through a price 
index. For the purpose of representability, one must be aware that Airbnb caters to different 
travelers than hotels and the two data masses are not fully comparable. Research has 
indicated that business travelers are less likely to seek accommodation in Airbnb (Zervas et 
al, 2015). However, the supply and demand mechanics are similar between the two. My 
approach limits the geographical scope to some extent. By having data points from North 
America, Europe and Australia, this research avoids focusing on just one region and one 
culture. However, all locations are Western developed countries and all cities in the sample 
are major cities. Asian cultures and smaller locations are omitted from the study. Including 
smaller locations could provide locations that demonstrate a younger phase in Airbnb 
adoption and the service lifecycle, but could also provide a less perfect sample compared to 
a city such as Paris with some 56 000 listings available for analysis.  
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5 Conclusion 
This research sought to examine the extent at which individuals are equipped to perform 
revenue management and thus perform on-par with the hotels in the hospitality industry. 
Through a combination of empirical data analysis and previous research into pricing and 
sharing motivations, this research was able to shed light into the unresearched phenomenon 
and provide theoretical and managerial contribution for future purposes. This research 
identified phenomena that would merit further research – both quantitative and qualitative 
in nature. Furthermore, should future business models be dependent on individuals pricing 
their own offering, considerations should be made not only from the view of the viability of 
the business for the individual and platform provider, but also the regulatory aspects to avoid 
unleveled playing fields and predatory pricing. 
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7 Appendix  
7.1 Appendix A – Visualizations, data tables and charts 
Tables A1: Tables detailing number of Airbnb listings and visualizing the growth of specific categories 
from 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entire home/apt Private room Shared room Total (end 2016/early 2017)
Amsterdam 78 % 21 % 0 % 15052
Barcelona 50 % 48 % 1 % 17318
Berlin 51 % 48 % 1 % 19102
Los Angeles 59 % 36 % 5 % 23309
Melbourne 57 % 41 % 2 % 12154
New Orleans 73 % 25 % 1 % 5399
San Francisco 59 % 39 % 2 % 8709
Sydney 62 % 36 % 2 % 23574
Toronto 63 % 34 % 3 % 12003
Entire home/apt Private room Shared room Total (early 2015)
Amsterdam 81 % 19 % 1 % 7785
Barcelona 59 % 41 % 0 % 12006
Berlin 61 % 38 % 1 % 15276
Los Angeles 60 % 36 % 4 % 14416
Melbourne 52 % 46 % 3 % 5375
New Orleans 68 % 31 % 2 % 2597
San Francisco 59 % 36 % 5 % 5405
Sydney 59 % 39 % 1 % 9611
Toronto 64 % 34 % 3 % 5731
Total (end 2016/early 2017)
London 50 % 48 % 1 % 53831
New York 49 % 48 % 3 % 40804
Paris 86 % 13 % 1 % 56430
Total (early 2015)
London 52 % 46 % 2 % 18363
New York 58 % 39 % 3 % 27391
Paris 84 % 15 % 1 % 29012
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Graphs A2: Graphs visualizing the different expansion rate of Airbnb in different cities 
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Graphs A3: Graphs visualizing the difference in revenue management magnitude between Airbnb and hotel 
accommodation across different locations 
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Tables A4: Tables detailing the effects that number of bookings have on the intensity on 
revenue management (price standard deviation) 
 
Amsterdam 
 
 
Barcelona 
 
 
Berlin 
 
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 37,90 % 29,13 % 16,46 % 7,64 % 3,43 % 2,07 % 1,11 % 0,63 % 0,39 % 1,09 %
% of 2016 34,37 % 30,35 % 17,53 % 7,71 % 3,98 % 2,14 % 1,35 % 0,74 % 0,48 % 1,21 %
% of 2017 34,58 % 32,07 % 15,89 % 7,74 % 3,52 % 2,17 % 1,22 % 0,85 % 0,50 % 1,26 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 24,12 % 33,14 % 21,41 % 9,63 % 4,69 % 2,66 % 1,55 % 1,06 % 0,57 % 1,18 %
% of 2016 26,77 % 31,72 % 19,56 % 9,19 % 4,94 % 2,41 % 1,90 % 0,98 % 0,69 % 1,83 %
% of 2017 17,92 % 38,48 % 20,16 % 9,30 % 4,82 % 2,88 % 1,90 % 1,35 % 0,87 % 2,31 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 14,64 % 30,85 % 26,17 % 12,22 % 6,59 % 3,81 % 2,08 % 1,13 % 0,95 % 1,56 %
% of 2016 15,35 % 33,19 % 24,52 % 11,70 % 5,77 % 2,77 % 2,43 % 1,42 % 1,01 % 1,82 %
% of 2017 16,06 % 37,74 % 19,45 % 10,08 % 5,72 % 3,39 % 2,18 % 1,58 % 0,94 % 2,86 %
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 31,97 % 39,95 % 14,20 % 6,63 % 2,82 % 1,59 % 0,96 % 0,48 % 0,39 % 0,96 %
% of 2016 38,78 % 32,31 % 11,18 % 6,45 % 3,47 % 2,32 % 1,39 % 1,25 % 0,75 % 2,05 %
% of 2017 25,78 % 34,06 % 12,80 % 7,07 % 5,45 % 3,78 % 2,51 % 1,98 % 1,47 % 5,06 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 20,47 % 43,74 % 16,17 % 9,08 % 4,15 % 2,18 % 1,25 % 0,78 % 0,61 % 1,58 %
% of 2016 25,40 % 37,68 % 13,75 % 8,59 % 4,68 % 3,07 % 1,74 % 1,67 % 0,83 % 2,59 %
% of 2017 20,29 % 33,65 % 13,81 % 8,12 % 6,44 % 4,57 % 3,03 % 2,37 % 1,85 % 5,86 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 21,81 % 51,55 % 11,59 % 6,11 % 2,55 % 2,01 % 0,36 % 1,00 % 0,46 % 2,55 %
% of 2016 23,67 % 37,82 % 14,16 % 8,99 % 4,94 % 3,21 % 1,86 % 1,77 % 0,82 % 2,75 %
% of 2017 15,38 % 31,68 % 14,24 % 9,36 % 7,61 % 5,51 % 3,80 % 3,07 % 2,21 % 7,13 %
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 45,44 % 37,97 % 9,62 % 3,23 % 1,36 % 0,86 % 0,48 % 0,24 % 0,25 % 0,48 %
% of 2016 42,44 % 43,39 % 8,39 % 2,69 % 1,25 % 0,52 % 0,41 % 0,21 % 0,14 % 0,48 %
% of 2017 37,85 % 49,11 % 7,85 % 2,45 % 1,06 % 0,56 % 0,25 % 0,20 % 0,15 % 0,45 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 60,34 % 20,69 % 8,62 % 3,45 % 3,45 % 3,45 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 % 0,00 %
% of 2016 24,82 % 53,52 % 12,98 % 4,06 % 1,87 % 0,84 % 0,62 % 0,29 % 0,23 % 0,73 %
% of 2017 24,87 % 56,84 % 11,17 % 3,16 % 1,60 % 0,80 % 0,35 % 0,29 % 0,21 % 0,71 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015
% of 2016 16,63 % 55,31 % 16,05 % 5,66 % 2,71 % 1,33 % 0,69 % 0,29 % 0,29 % 1,04 %
% of 2017 25,14 % 55,12 % 11,71 % 3,37 % 1,86 % 0,91 % 0,35 % 0,42 % 0,35 % 0,75 %
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London 
 
 
Los Angeles 
 
 
Melbourne 
 
 
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 48,39 % 32,49 % 10,07 % 4,13 % 1,77 % 1,23 % 0,67 % 0,48 % 0,17 % 0,56 %
% of 2016 42,29 % 36,61 % 10,74 % 4,32 % 2,24 % 1,43 % 0,73 % 0,48 % 0,29 % 0,82 %
% of 2017 41,35 % 39,81 % 9,46 % 3,88 % 2,14 % 1,15 % 0,66 % 0,37 % 0,24 % 0,90 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 44,04 % 35,12 % 10,68 % 4,55 % 1,95 % 1,39 % 0,76 % 0,59 % 0,19 % 0,73 %
% of 2016 29,57 % 43,05 % 13,81 % 5,67 % 2,96 % 1,98 % 0,91 % 0,59 % 0,36 % 1,11 %
% of 2017 32,67 % 44,68 % 10,68 % 4,72 % 2,87 % 1,46 % 0,87 % 0,49 % 0,28 % 1,27 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 33,75 % 42,57 % 12,08 % 4,97 % 2,07 % 1,52 % 0,99 % 0,51 % 0,27 % 1,26 %
% of 2016 27,40 % 44,01 % 13,86 % 5,98 % 3,05 % 2,24 % 0,97 % 0,65 % 0,46 % 1,38 %
% of 2017 34,09 % 44,17 % 9,97 % 4,45 % 2,80 % 1,43 % 0,91 % 0,53 % 0,29 % 1,36 %
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 40,06 % 29,05 % 14,34 % 6,22 % 2,97 % 1,96 % 1,18 % 0,78 % 0,54 % 2,86 %
% of 2016 34,61 % 35,61 % 13,43 % 5,65 % 2,87 % 2,10 % 1,06 % 0,74 % 0,61 % 3,26 %
% of 2017 32,66 % 38,35 % 12,82 % 5,45 % 2,95 % 2,05 % 1,20 % 0,95 % 0,60 % 2,95 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 25,02 % 33,22 % 18,31 % 8,16 % 3,85 % 2,77 % 1,95 % 1,26 % 0,76 % 4,69 %
% of 2016 28,39 % 37,17 % 14,99 % 6,47 % 3,37 % 2,50 % 1,32 % 0,88 % 0,73 % 4,15 %
% of 2017 23,10 % 42,19 % 14,90 % 6,30 % 3,64 % 2,53 % 1,58 % 1,21 % 0,75 % 3,78 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 36,93 % 27,68 % 14,43 % 6,83 % 2,77 % 2,36 % 1,59 % 1,24 % 0,88 % 5,30 %
% of 2016 21,82 % 37,85 % 17,46 % 7,33 % 4,04 % 3,10 % 1,60 % 1,19 % 0,94 % 4,66 %
% of 2017 23,21 % 40,91 % 15,10 % 6,49 % 3,69 % 2,58 % 1,68 % 1,33 % 0,79 % 4,21 %
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 44,52 % 26,48 % 12,86 % 6,52 % 3,51 % 1,99 % 1,09 % 0,83 % 0,56 % 1,44 %
% of 2016 38,74 % 30,96 % 12,65 % 6,99 % 3,64 % 2,32 % 1,45 % 1,01 % 0,59 % 1,57 %
% of 2017 33,05 % 35,52 % 13,33 % 6,74 % 3,83 % 2,63 % 1,47 % 0,91 % 0,61 % 1,86 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 34,24 % 32,27 % 15,15 % 6,51 % 4,37 % 1,92 % 1,87 % 1,12 % 0,75 % 1,81 %
% of 2016 32,50 % 35,15 % 13,77 % 7,50 % 3,83 % 2,35 % 1,63 % 1,27 % 0,52 % 1,47 %
% of 2017 27,89 % 36,47 % 14,70 % 7,86 % 4,51 % 3,08 % 1,69 % 0,96 % 0,70 % 2,15 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015
% of 2016 28,39 % 36,84 % 14,65 % 7,92 % 4,20 % 2,78 % 1,75 % 1,46 % 0,54 % 1,46 %
% of 2017 25,55 % 35,17 % 15,97 % 8,70 % 5,01 % 3,53 % 1,86 % 1,13 % 0,83 % 2,23 %
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New Orleans 
 
 
New York 
 
 
Paris 
 
 
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 28,10 % 17,47 % 17,71 % 12,36 % 7,29 % 4,94 % 2,35 % 1,84 % 2,11 % 5,76 %
% of 2016 17,53 % 15,91 % 17,70 % 12,06 % 8,67 % 6,89 % 4,49 % 3,62 % 2,49 % 10,54 %
% of 2017 12,88 % 15,72 % 14,56 % 12,45 % 9,19 % 6,57 % 5,02 % 4,17 % 3,45 % 15,94 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 21,88 % 16,61 % 19,63 % 13,58 % 7,94 % 5,59 % 2,87 % 2,14 % 2,87 % 6,89 %
% of 2016 7,72 % 14,45 % 20,62 % 14,81 % 10,44 % 7,88 % 5,53 % 4,26 % 2,89 % 11,39 %
% of 2017 6,54 % 15,04 % 16,21 % 13,27 % 10,28 % 6,91 % 5,42 % 4,45 % 3,97 % 17,91 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 31,30 % 15,37 % 15,65 % 12,05 % 5,12 % 5,68 % 2,35 % 1,52 % 3,88 % 7,06 %
% of 2016 6,29 % 11,81 % 20,53 % 15,77 % 10,92 % 8,92 % 5,40 % 5,14 % 2,89 % 12,32 %
% of 2017 6,78 % 13,69 % 16,29 % 13,45 % 10,27 % 7,29 % 5,20 % 4,69 % 3,94 % 18,41 %
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 39,21 % 24,45 % 16,42 % 8,15 % 4,17 % 2,43 % 1,43 % 1,02 % 0,56 % 1,99 %
% of 2016 32,68 % 29,53 % 17,22 % 8,62 % 4,10 % 2,59 % 1,46 % 0,94 % 0,63 % 2,06 %
% of 2017 30,16 % 35,56 % 16,27 % 7,12 % 3,42 % 2,30 % 1,35 % 0,91 % 0,62 % 2,24 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 20,20 % 29,19 % 22,32 % 11,13 % 5,71 % 3,24 % 2,35 % 1,51 % 0,87 % 3,48 %
% of 2016 16,07 % 32,33 % 22,86 % 11,22 % 5,53 % 3,71 % 2,35 % 1,39 % 1,01 % 3,52 %
% of 2017 18,31 % 38,74 % 19,23 % 8,94 % 4,29 % 3,03 % 1,80 % 1,28 % 0,93 % 3,45 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 29,13 % 26,90 % 18,46 % 9,09 % 4,78 % 3,21 % 2,33 % 1,26 % 0,88 % 3,96 %
% of 2016 18,22 % 32,17 % 22,23 % 10,20 % 5,02 % 3,59 % 2,56 % 1,57 % 0,96 % 3,47 %
% of 2017 19,51 % 38,13 % 18,77 % 8,66 % 4,08 % 3,03 % 1,81 % 1,35 % 0,95 % 3,70 %
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 53,65 % 33,25 % 7,97 % 2,56 % 0,93 % 0,55 % 0,25 % 0,20 % 0,13 % 0,47 %
% of 2016 46,90 % 36,15 % 9,90 % 3,18 % 1,42 % 0,88 % 0,44 % 0,26 % 0,21 % 0,62 %
% of 2017 51,11 % 35,89 % 7,58 % 2,53 % 1,03 % 0,61 % 0,34 % 0,22 % 0,16 % 0,53 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 49,10 % 35,81 % 9,12 % 2,94 % 1,14 % 0,62 % 0,30 % 0,24 % 0,15 % 0,57 %
% of 2016 37,46 % 41,29 % 12,30 % 3,99 % 1,82 % 1,13 % 0,58 % 0,33 % 0,27 % 0,81 %
% of 2017 50,01 % 35,78 % 8,21 % 2,76 % 1,13 % 0,68 % 0,39 % 0,24 % 0,19 % 0,60 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 48,49 % 35,91 % 9,43 % 2,96 % 1,16 % 0,63 % 0,36 % 0,24 % 0,14 % 0,66 %
% of 2016 35,87 % 41,51 % 13,00 % 4,23 % 1,97 % 1,21 % 0,64 % 0,37 % 0,30 % 0,90 %
% of 2017 49,11 % 35,77 % 8,60 % 2,95 % 1,24 % 0,75 % 0,41 % 0,27 % 0,21 % 0,67 %
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San Francisco 
 
 
Sydney 
 
 
Toronto 
 
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 37,64 % 18,94 % 16,69 % 9,09 % 4,91 % 3,58 % 1,95 % 1,42 % 1,35 % 4,29 %
% of 2016 37,39 % 22,73 % 14,20 % 7,45 % 4,36 % 3,38 % 1,94 % 1,46 % 1,08 % 5,81 %
% of 2017 37,79 % 27,29 % 14,60 % 6,91 % 3,41 % 2,65 % 1,56 % 1,05 % 0,78 % 3,87 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 25,30 % 20,39 % 20,35 % 10,70 % 5,87 % 5,11 % 3,10 % 1,89 % 1,73 % 5,51 %
% of 2016 32,09 % 24,32 % 15,73 % 8,27 % 4,88 % 3,41 % 2,15 % 1,72 % 1,19 % 6,24 %
% of 2017 23,57 % 29,98 % 19,08 % 8,83 % 4,62 % 3,28 % 2,22 % 1,56 % 1,21 % 5,63 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 14,72 % 17,38 % 21,88 % 10,63 % 7,57 % 8,79 % 3,48 % 2,25 % 2,25 % 11,04 %
% of 2016 21,28 % 26,94 % 18,17 % 9,76 % 6,06 % 4,38 % 3,15 % 1,67 % 1,39 % 7,17 %
% of 2017 23,56 % 28,52 % 19,78 % 8,70 % 4,33 % 3,52 % 2,33 % 1,70 % 1,41 % 6,15 %
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 49,55 % 18,84 % 11,21 % 6,21 % 3,65 % 2,69 % 1,57 % 1,23 % 0,99 % 3,79 %
% of 2016 47,37 % 21,36 % 10,05 % 5,96 % 3,24 % 2,81 % 1,73 % 1,30 % 0,99 % 4,88 %
% of 2017 35,32 % 27,26 % 12,51 % 6,78 % 4,21 % 3,53 % 2,06 % 1,53 % 1,06 % 5,60 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 36,14 % 24,89 % 15,69 % 7,41 % 4,52 % 2,81 % 1,97 % 1,43 % 1,08 % 4,04 %
% of 2016 39,38 % 30,33 % 12,32 % 6,40 % 3,30 % 2,38 % 1,55 % 0,99 % 0,61 % 2,71 %
% of 2017 24,44 % 31,65 % 15,36 % 8,07 % 5,06 % 3,96 % 2,36 % 1,89 % 1,20 % 5,98 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 32,60 % 22,31 % 15,71 % 7,70 % 5,50 % 3,77 % 2,75 % 1,89 % 1,49 % 6,28 %
% of 2016 38,07 % 31,43 % 12,42 % 6,50 % 3,34 % 2,49 % 1,61 % 1,01 % 0,63 % 2,49 %
% of 2017 25,10 % 29,41 % 15,66 % 8,13 % 5,40 % 4,03 % 2,57 % 2,00 % 1,27 % 6,43 %
ALL
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 47,90 % 26,33 % 11,89 % 5,45 % 3,17 % 1,97 % 0,92 % 0,61 % 0,47 % 1,27 %
% of 2016 44,34 % 30,67 % 11,16 % 5,12 % 2,72 % 1,79 % 1,03 % 0,81 % 0,49 % 1,82 %
% of 2017 30,27 % 37,95 % 13,53 % 6,23 % 3,55 % 2,14 % 1,69 % 1,03 % 0,79 % 2,77 %
Revenue management of listings with >90 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 38,35 % 30,38 % 14,29 % 6,54 % 3,65 % 2,66 % 1,15 % 0,69 % 0,60 % 1,65 %
% of 2016 38,45 % 34,59 % 12,86 % 5,63 % 2,73 % 1,80 % 1,10 % 0,66 % 0,45 % 1,73 %
% of 2017 19,54 % 40,57 % 15,85 % 7,62 % 4,65 % 2,77 % 2,37 % 1,45 % 1,15 % 4,03 %
Revenue management of listings with >180 bookings per year
STD=0 STD<10 STD<20 STD<30 STD<40 STD<50 STD<60 STD<70 STD<80 STD>80
% of 2015 44,87 % 25,63 % 11,05 % 6,15 % 4,21 % 3,19 % 1,37 % 0,46 % 0,46 % 2,62 %
% of 2016 44,02 % 32,53 % 11,89 % 5,10 % 2,15 % 1,63 % 0,86 % 0,51 % 0,15 % 1,16 %
% of 2017 18,93 % 40,55 % 15,17 % 7,49 % 5,02 % 2,87 % 2,71 % 1,60 % 0,97 % 4,70 %
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7.2 Appendix B – Trivago hotel price indices 
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7.3 Appendix C – Other 
Picture C1: Host comments about Airbnb’s poor pricing transparency and price suggestions Airbnb 
Community Center. (2016-2017). Ridiculous price tips. 
https://community.withairbnb.com/t5/Hosting/ridiculous-price-tips/td-p/48793 
 
 
